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A LEGAL GIANT IS DEAD
Henry Paul Monaghan*
Herbert Wechsler died at his home on April 26, 2000. Two days
later, the New York Times obituary's headline announced the passing of a
"legal giant," a richly merited appellation.' Herbert Wechsler was, I be-
lieve, the greatest academic figure in the history of Columbia Law School.
At the height of his career, Herb stood at the top of three academic
fields: criminal law, constitutional law, and federal jurisdiction. His
achievements were, moreover, not confined to Columbia, the faculty of
which he joined in 1933 after having served as law clerk to justice Harlan
Fiske Stone. From 1944 to 1946, Herb served as assistant attorney general
in charge of the War Division. When the Nuremberg trials began, he
provided technical advice to the American judges. In 1964, he argued
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,2 the most important First Amendment de-
cision of the twentieth century. And, of course, for over two decades,
Herb was director of the American Law Institute.
For my generation, Herb was the symbol of this law school. Later
legal scholars were greatly influenced by the extraordinary quality of his
achievements. These included, of course, co-authorship of The Federal
Courts and The Federal System, 3 his famous Holmes Lecture, "Toward Neu-
tral Principles of Constitutional Law," 4 and the ALI Model Penal Code.
And even when long retired from active teaching, Herb remained an in-
spiration and a vital force in this school's life. On his death, numerous
students approached the Dean and other faculty members requesting a
commemoration. While they had never met Herb, they had studied his
work, and that study had left a lasting impression.
No one writer could do justice to all of Herb's rich and varied contri-
butions to the law. In my case, for example, the Model Penal Code,
which Herb considered to be his proudest achievement, appeared four
years after I had graduated from law school. And I can say very little
about Herb's general ALI contributions. For me, however, the aspect of
Herb's work that most stands out, an aspect that also embraces the Model
Penal Code and his ALI directorship, was Herb's intense interest in what
judges and lawyers actually do, the kinds of problems they face and must
resolve.
* Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law, Columbia Law School-
1. Tamar Lewin, Herbert Wechsler, Legal Giant, Is Dead At 90, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28,
2000, at C21 [hereinafter Obituary].
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3. Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Herbert Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System
(1953) [hereinafter Hart & Wechsler].
4. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L.
Rev. 1 (1959) [hereinafter Wechsler, Neutral Principles].
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I.
Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System ("Hart &
Wechsler"), published in 1953, immediately achieved an extraordinary ed-
ucational reputation, and rightly so. Far more than a particularly stimu-
lating collection of cases and basic source materials, Hart & Wechsler's
central purpose (although by no means its only one) was to examine the
proper functioning of the federal (and the state) courts in "Our Federal-
ism." 5 But Hart & Wechsler's real greatness is that, through its extensive
notes and its inimitable leading questions, the book constantly "prod-
ded.., students and [teachers] to think over their heads about the deep-
est problems of the legal process."6
I recall clearly when I first encountered Hart & Wechsler. In 1960, as
an LL.M. candidate, I enrolled in Henry Hart's federal courts course.
That course met on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays at noon in
Harvard's Langdell Hall, and it was affectionately known as "Darkness at
Noon." I enrolled believing (modestly) that I already luminously under-
stood nearly everything worth knowing, having, after all, already taken
such a course (using, needless to say, a different casebook) and having
clerked for a circuit judge. Fortunately, it took me no time at all to real-
ize the depth of my mistake. Like Kant on reading Hume, the scales fell
from my eyes.
II.
Herb's numerous law review articles were characterized by insight
and great clarity of presentation. For example, in analyzing the rules gov-
erning the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over state courts, Herb
articulated the importance of distinguishing between review of state law
grounds logically antecedent to disposition of federal claims, and those
that are not.7 In his well known and highly regarded article "The Politi-
cal Safeguards of Federalism," Herb argued for a relatively modest judi-
cial role when courts are asked to impose federalism limits on Congress.8
5. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). Hart & Wechsler was to provide the
judicial counterpart to the basic course in constitutional law, which centers upon the
legislative and executive aspects of American federalism.
6. Address by Kingman Brewster, Jr., President of Yale University, in awarding an
LLD. posthumously to Professor Hart, New Haven, Connecticut, June 9, 1969, quoted in
Henry P. Monaghan, Book Review, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1753, 1753 (1970). Herb's coauthor,
Henry Hart, too, surely merited the appellation "legal gianL"
7. See Herbert Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court:
Reflections on the Law and the Logistics of Direct Review, 34 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1043,
1050-56 (1977).
8. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev.
543, 559 (1954), reprinted in Herbert Wechsler, Principles, Politics and Fundamental Law:
Selected Essays 49, 81-82 (1961) [hereinafter Wechsler, Fundamentals]. For a recent
examination of this article, see Larry D. Kramer, Putting The Politics Back Into The
Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 215 (2000). To Herb's emphasis of
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That theme has always resonated in our constitutional jurisprudence, and
most recently, it played a significant role in the opinions of the four dis-
sentingjustices in United States v. Morrison.9 There, a narrow majority of
the Court held that Congress lacked authority to enact the Violence
Against Women Act.
Herb's most famous article, however, was "Toward Neutral Principles
of Constitutional Law,"' 0 a Holmes Lecture which was delivered in three
parts in 1959 at Harvard. Herb expressed a mounting concern among
segments of the bar and the judiciary that the Warren Court's decisions
were inadequately "principled." "His articulation of those themes was de-
cisive in shaping contemporary constitutional theory," Professor Whit-
tington recently wrote.1 1 After criticizing several important Supreme
Court civil liberties decisions, including the unexplained per curiam appli-
cations of Brown v. Board of Education12 to "public transportation, parks,
golf courses, bath houses, and beaches," 13 he concluded his lecture by
calling into question Brown itself,14 the century's most important civil lib-
erties decision. Assuming equal school facilities, Herb suggested that
Brown ultimately raised an issue of competing freedoms: freedom to asso-
ciate and freedom not to associate. Was there, he then asked, "a basis in
neutral principles for holding that the Constitution demands that the
claims for association should prevail?" 15 Whatever the merits of his analy-
sis of Brown itself,16 Herb's challenge gave "[c]onstitutional theory... its
modem form."17 In subsequent years, constitutional theorists would
such institutional factors as the composition of Congress, Professor Kramer draws attention
to non-institutional factors, such as political parties.
9. 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1776-77 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
10. 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959), reprinted in Wechsler, Fundamentals, supra note 8, at
3.
11. Keith E. Whittington, Herbert Wechsler's Complaint and the Revival of Grand
Constitutional Theory, 34 U. Rich. L. Rev. 509, 514 (2000).
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 4, at 22.
14. Id. at 33-34.
15. Id. at 34.
16. Herb subsequently acknowledged criticism of his Brown analysis by several friends,
noting only that their defenses "advance[d] reasons differing substantially from" the
Court's rationale, and that for him they were not persuasive. Characteristically, Herb
urged the reader to judge for himself or herself. Wechsler, Fundamentals, supra note 8, at
xiv-xv. His only other comment on Brown does not cast any additional light on his
thinking. Silber and Miller, Toward "Neutral Principles in the Law: Selections From the
Oral History of Herbert Wechsler, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 854, 865-66 (1993) [hereinafter
Silber & Miller, Oral History].
17. Whittington, supra note 11, at 513. I should add, however, that "Neutral
Principles" also had an important second objective, one that has now receded from view.
"Neutral Principles" was intended as a direct challenge to Judge Learned Hand's Holmes
Lectures delivered just a year earlier. Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights (1958). See Silber
and Miller, Oral History, supra note 16, at 931 (describing Hand's view as unacceptable to
everyone). Wechsler's first lecture, "The Basis of Judicial Review," was fully devoted to
rejecting Hand's claim, id. at 14-15, 27-29, thatjudicial review was an extrajudicial-albeit
necessary-"import[ation]" by the Supreme Court. His second lecture, "The Standard of
1372 [Vol. 100:1370
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struggle with this demand for adequately principled adjudication, and
the focal high point of this struggle was, for most, Roe v. Wade.18
Discussions of "Neutral Principles" have been excessively preoccu-
pied with the word "neutral." What Herb insisted upon was not so much
that the governing principle should be neutral, but that the applicable
principle should be neutrally and generally applied.19 The lasting signifi-
cance of "Neutral Principles," however, inheres in Herb's insistence that
all adjudication must be entirely principled. "I put it to you," he famously
wrote, "that the main constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it
must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that is
involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite tran-
scending the immediate result that is achieved."20 ("His point," said Jus-
tice Ginsburg, "was that the way we decide things is very often-he'd say
always, I'd say often-as important as what we decide."2 1) For Herb,
there was nothing distinctive in the nature of constitutional adjudication.
Review," not only focused on neutral principles, but also rejected Hand's claim that the
Bill of Rights was too open-ended to be judicially enforceable. Wechsler, Neutral
Principles, supra note 4, at 16-19. In this lecture Herb reveals a decidedly "non-originalist"
approach to what he characterized as the judicial "obligation of interpreting the open-
ended concepts of the Constitution." Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and The
Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1001, 1011 (1965) [hereinafter Wechsler, The Courts]. "I
cannot find it in my heart to regret that [constitutional] interpretation did not ground
itself in ancient history but rather has perceived in [the constitutional provisions] a
compendious affirmation of the basic values of a free society, values that must be given
weight in legislation and administration at the risk of courting trouble in the courts."
Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 4, at 19.
18. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Insofar as the search for adequate "principles" extended
beyond those drawn from the Constitution's text, structure, and history, that practice was
sharply challenged by ProfessorJohn Hart Ely in Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental
Values, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 5, 15-55 (1978), reprinted in Democracy and Distrust 43-72
(1980), and in The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment On Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920
(1973).
19. See Wechsler, Fundamentals, supra note 8, at xiii-xiv.
As to the choice of adjective, my case is simply that I could discover none that
better serves my purpose .... As to my meaning. . I certainly do not deny that
constitutional provisions are directed to protecting certain special values or that
the principled development of a particular provision is concerned with the value
or the values thus involved. The demand of neutrality is that a value and its
measure be determined by a general analysis that gives no weight to accidents of
application, finding a scope that is acceptable whatever interest, group, or person
may assert the claim.
Id. See also Silber & Miller, Oral History, supra note 16, at 924-31.
20. Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 4, at 15.
21. Obituary, supra note 1. Interestingly, no Supreme Court decision seems to have
used the word "principled" to describe a quality of thought or rule as a minimum standard
for constitutional adjudication before the word's appearance in Herb's famous article.
Since then, however, Justices have considered whether they, or their colleagues, are
"principled" more than two hundred times. See, e.g. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct.
2348, 2356-60 (2000), United States v. Morrison, 120 S. CL 1740, 1755-59 (2000), Board
of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 120 S. Ct. 1346, 1356-57 (2000), all
decided last term.
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One could dispute what the principles were, but the need to render gen-
erally applicable and adequately reasoned results were the defining char-
acteristics of the judicial process. 22
Herb stood very far removed from those who insist that constitu-
tional adjudication has no "principles" whatsoever; that it always has
been, and should remain, simply politics carried on by other means.
23
Courts, he said, "are bound to function otherwise than as a naked power
organ; they participate as courts of law . . . in that they are-or are
obliged to be-entirely principled."24 Herb was also removed, certainly
by inclination, from those who would treat constitutional adjudication (at
least in the area of civil liberties) as simply a branch of political, social, or
moral philosophy, in which the fundamental dispute, in the end, is re-
solved by deciding whose philosophy is the best or the most powerful.
25
Herb, in fact, professed a quite modest conception of the scope of
federal judicial authority. For him, the federal courts, including the Su-
preme Court, had no freestanding commission to enforce statutory or
constitutional limits against government officials. Quite to the contrary;
their sole legitimate authority was to "say what the law is" only when such
a determination was necessary to the disposition of cases over which they
had jurisdiction. 26 And Herb saw nothing internal to Article III itself (as
opposed to "external" limitations, such as those contained in the Bill of
Rights and other amendments) that limited plenary Congressional au-
thority over the federal courts' jurisdiction, including the appellate juris-
diction of the Supreme Court.2 7
22. See Silber & Miller, Oral History, supra note 16, at 928-29. "The requirement [of
reasoned results]," Justice Scalia recently wrote, "is the only thing that prevents this Court
from being some sort of nine-headed Caesar, giving thumbs-up or thumbs-down to
whatever outcome, case-by-case, suits or offends its collective fancy." Dickerson v. United
States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2342 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
23. For a recent such entry, see Terri Jennings Peretti, In Defense of Political Courts
(1999).
24. Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 4, at 19.
25. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law 343 (1996) (arguing that constitutional
interpretation, at least in the area of civil liberties, involves "fundamental questions of
political morality and philosophy"). But given Herb's expansive conception of
constitutional guarantees as a "compendious affirmation of the basic values of a free
society," see supra note 19, one can understand those who see Dworkin as one
embodiment of Herb's general vision of the nature of constitutional adjudication.
26. See Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 4, at 6.
The duty, to be sure, is not that of policing or advising legislatures or executives,
nor even, as the uninstructed think, of standing as an ever-open forum for the
ventilation of all grievances that draw upon the Constitution for support. It is the
duty to decide the litigated case and to decide it in accordance with the law.
Id. Thus the federal courts have no general "broad discretion to abstain or intervene." Id.
at 9.
27. See Wechsler, The Courts, supra note 17, at 1005 (rejecting a "narrow meaning"
for the "exceptions clause" as quite "antithetical to the [constitutional] plan"). Herb
insisted, however, that for practical reasons the general reservation of Congressional
authority was "more theoretical . . . than . . . real." Id. at 1007. But there remains the
1374 [Vol. 100:1370
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III.
Herb will forever be associated with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,28
the most important First Amendment decision of the last century, and, I
believe, in all of this country's First Amendmentjurisprudence. That de-
cision arose out of an advertisement in the New York Times on March 29,
1960. The advertisement alleged that police abuse had occurred in
Montgomery, Alabama, during the escalating civil rights sit-ins, freedom
rides, and marches in the South. It contained, at most, trivial factual mis-
statements, and it did not even name plaintiff Sullivan, the Montgomery
City Commissioner in charge of the police. 29 Sullivan, nonetheless,
sought $500,000 in damages. An all-white jury returned that verdict, the
then-highest defamation award in Alabama history, and the Supreme
Court of Alabama affirmed. When Sullivan reached the United States
Supreme Court, eleven additional libel suits were pending against the
Times, seeking more than $5 million in damages. (Other news organiza-
tions were also targets of similar litigation.) 30
Herb won in the Supreme Court, but that result (especially in the
heyday of the Warren Court) is not surprising. It was, after all, quite clear
that the national media could cover the civil rights movement in the
South only at the risk of bankruptcy unless the Sullivan judgment were
reversed. What was important, however, was the ground of victory. Here,
Herb reshaped legal thinking about the relationship governing the law of
libel, criticism of government officials, and the First Amendment. While
settled law held that "libel" was not speech protected by the First Amend-
ment, most lawyers understood that the First Amendment necessarily
hemmed in some of the elements of the draconian common law of libel.
In Sullivan, there was no proof of injury to Sullivan's reputation. (In-
deed, it seems likely that it improved.) The Alabama courts, however,
relied upon the entrenched common law paradigm that actual damages
could be "presumed."1 Many advocates would have argued that, in suits
brought by public figures, the First Amendment required proof of actual
injury, but in doing so they would have had to challenge the embedded
tradition of presuming actual damages. Avoiding that confrontation,
Herb took a different route. Against the common law paradigm, he in-
voked another paradigm: the American antipathy to "seditious libel,"
whether prosecuted criminally, or civilly through libel actions brought by
danger that Congress may be moved to chip away at the edges. In Felker v. Turpin, 518
U.S. 651 (1996), the questions were whether Congress had interfered with the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction in certain habeas corpus cases, and if so, whether the
Congressional interference was valid. While the Court answered the first question in the
negative, see id. at 660-61, two of Herb's colleagues, Jim Liebman and I, among
petitioner's counsel, argued that the creation of "one supreme Court" in article III of the
Constitution itself constrains Congressional authority.
28. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
29. Id. at 257-59.
30. Obituary, supra note 1.
31. 376 U.S. at 262-63, 267.
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government officials.3 2 For him, the American Republic rested upon the
belief that wide scope existed for criticism of government officials. The
Supreme Court agreed. Seditious libel could have no place in the United
States 3 3-and that, a prominent commentator said, was an "occasion for
dancing in the streets."3 4
While Sullivan (properly, I believe) did not completely overthrow the
law of defamation with respect to public officials, it did give significant
practical protection to the media. Instead of focusing upon situation-spe-
cific assessments of whether the record contained sufficient proof of ac-
tual injury to an official's reputation, the Court directed attention to the
media's knowledge of the truth. In so doing, the Court ultimately facili-
tated media pretrial dismissals, and it gave judges at all levels a more eas-
ily administrable role.
IV.
When I came to Columbia in 1982, Herb's analytic ability was legen-
dary. One of my colleagues, active in the ALI, told me that when Herb
rose to address a speaker, the audience quickened, given Herb's well-
known ability to cut the heart out of an argument before the speaker
even realized that he or she had incurred more than a simple flesh
wound. (Indeed, my colleague, also a person of imposing talents, said
that he himself could attest to such wounds.)3 5
Despite his formidable intellectual powers, however, Herb was an
eminently accessible colleague. He welcomed and responded warmly to
human contact, and he never lost his intellectual curiosity. The Times was
surely right; a legal giant is gone. The law school community will miss
him.
32. Libel, because it defamed; seditious, because it undermined confidence in the
government.
33. 376 U.S. at 273-77.
34. Harry Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note On The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment, 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 191, 221 n.125 (quoting private conversation with
Alexander Meiklejohn). While the Court has extended the holding of Sullivan beyond
public officials, I believe it is fair to say that the prohibition against seditious libel remains
the centerpiece of our First Amendment tradition.
35. I myself can attest to Herb's awe-inspiring reputation. One day early in the 1980s,
Herb and I were discussing our upcoming course, Federal Courts, and I said:
"Herb, what do you think about... ?"
Herb looked at me, or I should say, he looked through me as though my head
were a perfect vacuum, and he said: "The answer is rather obvious, isn't it?"
I replied: "That's what I think, too."
(Pause.)
"Which way is it obvious, Herb?"
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